Introduction
One of the most remarkable stories in criminal law is the recent rise of corporate prosecutions across the world. In the past, even in countries that permitted corporations to be prosecuted for crimes, such prosecutions were not a common practice and any fines were minimal. In the past fifteen years, though, in the United States, many of the largest corporate prosecutions in the world have been brought, often involving international crimes by multinational companies. Billion dollar corporate penalties are now a regular occurrence.
Multinational prosecutions have also involved cooperation by prosecutors across countries and parallel prosecutions of the same corporation for crimes committed in different countries.
Over the past decade and a half, federal prosecutors in the U.S. have adopted an approach in which settlement negotiations with companies are resolved, sometimes through a plea agreement, but in the largest cases, with agreements entered largely out of court and without judicial oversight. These agreements, called deferred and non-prosecution, have added new flexibility but also some additional uncertainty to the practice of corporate prosecutions. This U.S. approach has impacted countries that have sought to emulate the U.S. approach or adopted approaches seeking to improve upon it. In this Chapter, I discuss how this new U.S. approach has altered the international corporate prosecution landscape.
First, I discuss how traditionally, in most countries, corporate or entity-based criminal liability is limited and unavailable for many types of crimes. However, in recent years, this has changed. More countries have expanded corporate criminal liability, including in response to treaties like the OECD and the Lisbon Treaty which encouraged E.U. members to adopt criminal sanctions to legal persons. An additional driver of these changes has been a response to enforcement approaches in the U.S. Second, I discuss how when many countries do adopt This Chapter begins by discussing: (1) varying standards for corporate criminal liability; then (2) underlying corporate crimes and how standards and enforcement approaches may vary depending on the type of crime; (3) settlement approaches towards corporate criminal cases; (4) criticisms of corporate crime settlement approaches; and (5) international approaches and cooperation in corporate crime cases. There are no definitive answers to the question whether to adopt one approach or another towards corporate criminal liability. Corporate crimes can be incredibly costly and serious, but hopefully the experimentation with enforcement approaches will continue to produce increased enforcement and stronger deterrents against corporate crime across the globe.
I. Standards for Corporate Criminal Liability
Few foreign countries have anything like the broad standard for corporate criminal liability that the United States has long had in federal courts in any specific area of criminal liability, much less as a general standard for corporate criminal liability. Corporate criminal liability has long existed in the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Netherlands. Other common law countries such as Australia, Canada, and New Zealand also have some form of corporate criminal liability, but in most the concept remains quite narrow. However, civil law countries in Europe, Latin America, and elsewhere long had no corporate criminal liability except in limited areas, such as in antitrust or environmental crimes. France, for example, the corporation may be convicted only if employees acted through express power of attorney or delegation of power to employees; however, more recent cases have expanded the concept of delegation to include negligent supervision or compliance.
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In the United Kingdom, an "identification approach" had long been followed. affirmative defenses. 32 There has been discussion among academics about whether such a defense would be useful in other countries, including the U.S. One concern is whether a company at which crimes were committed could easily show that its compliance was adequate.
A separate practical concern is that corporations tend not to want to litigate corporate crimes, and compliance may already informally affect settlement negotiations.
II. Underlying Corporate Crimes
In the U.S., a variety of crimes are commonly charged as against corporations, including antitrust, environmental crimes, foreign bribery, fraud, money laundering offenses, securities fraud, and others. Some of these crimes, like the federal crimes of wire fraud and mail fraud, are incredibly broad. Different approaches to various crimes characterize how prosecutors respond to corporate criminal liability.
One of the most distinct and successful approaches is the U.S. Department of Justice's Antitrust Division's Leniency Program. That approach strongly incentivizes firms to be the first to report cartel behavior, relying on the inherent instability of price fixing cartels among competitors. 33 Many countries have adopted similar approaches towards price fixing cartel enforcement, and parallel civil litigation is now common. There has been a "convergence in leniency programs," with dozens of countries adopting programs modelled on the U.S. Antitrust Division approach. 34 In turn, this has made it "more attractive for companies to simultaneously seek and obtain amnesty in the United States, Europe, Canada and other jurisdictions."
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Converging approaches, cooperation in investigations, and a priority on antitrust enforcement in countries like the U.S., has encouraged more enforcement around the world.
Other groups of federal prosecutors in the U.S. have adopted their own distinct approaches. The U.S. Department of Justice's Tax Division adopted a programmatic amnesty program for Swiss Banks facilitating tax evasion in the U.S., with a structured set of settlement 32 Clifford Change, supra, at 2. options designed to incentivize self-reporting, cooperation, and disclosure of names of taxpayers.
U.S. environmental crime enforcement is also distinct. The Environment and Natural
Resources Division at the DOJ does not normally use deferred and non-prosecution agreements.
Civil enforcers bring tens of thousands of civil actions each year, but they refer few cases to criminal prosecutors. When criminal cases are brought, plea agreements with criminal convictions are the norm. In the area of vessel pollution, the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships has played an important role, leading to the enactment of the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships (APPS) and to increased U.S. enforcement in recent years.
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The cases are often brought to the attention of the Coast Guard due to a whistleblower program rewarding seamen who report illegal oily discharges to them; the reward may consist in as much as half of the criminal fine, and the fines in these cases are sometimes in the millions of dollars.
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The Fraud Section has adopted a detailed pilot program for Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Criminal procedure rules, however, were not adapted to corporations, and criminal prosecutions for environmental crimes in Brazil remained rare.
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III. Negotiated Corporate Settlements
In the United States, corporate prosecutions have exploded in size. 43 That is, more corporations are not being prosecuted by federal prosecutors, but the size of the penalties in the largest cases that have exponentially increased. Multi-billion dollar fines are now an annual occurrence. Many were quite high-profile prosecutions; well over half were public corporations, and many were Fortune 500 and Global 500 companies.
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In the 1990s, if corporations were prosecuted in the U.S., they were typically convicted and sentenced by a judge. Today, far more of the truly important corporate prosecutions do not result in a conviction but rather are resolved alternatives called deferred prosecution agreements.
A deferred prosecution is filed with the court and consists in an agreement to toll the Speedy Trial Act deadlines and to keep the case inactive on the judge's docket until a time period for the defendant to comply is completed. Then the case is dismissed. Such agreements had been often used as an alternative to an indictment and conviction for first-time offenders or juveniles, but it was a new idea to use them in serious corporate cases. A non-prosecution agreement is a variant that is completely out of court; it is never filed with a judge. Rather, in it prosecutors agree that they will not file a case if the corporation complies with the terms of the agreement. Press 2014) (describing an increase in average corporate fines over the past two decades, from less than $2,000,000 in average fines per year before 2000, to over $15,000,000 in average corporate fines by 2010). 44 Id. at 62 (noting that thirty-one percent of corporations were either a Fortune or Global 500 firm the year they settled their prosecutions).
The adoption of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Chapter designed specifically for organizations, in 1991, heralded an increase in corporate criminal fines. Those Guidelines included provisions to reduce fines for corporations with effective ethics and compliance programs, and they also based fines on the size of a company and the involvement of top-level officials. Thus, although the federal respondeat superior standard is broad, these Guidelines attempted to set out a more nuanced approach towards punishing corporations criminally. Under the federal Alternative Fines Act, a company can also be ordered to pay up to twice the "gross gain or loss" from the offense; the provision is not frequently used, however. 
timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing; (7) any remedial actions, such as firing wrongdoers and cooperating with government agencies; (8) the collateral consequences that a prosecution would cause, including to shareholders, (9) whether it would be sufficient to impose civil or regulatory remedies, and (10) the adequacy of prosecutions of individuals. 52 Those factors are "illustrative" and not an exclusive or "exhaustive" list, and "no single factor will be dispositive." Thus, prosecutors retain substantial discretion to weigh these various considerations in any given case.
Despite that flexibility, common approaches can be observed when reading the terms of these agreements. Deferred prosecution agreements are commonly quite complex, as are the goals of these corporate prosecution agreements. The agreements can include criminal fines, as well as other penalties such as restitution to victims, civil forfeiture, payments to regulators, and community service payments. They can specify compliance terms, including creation of new positions to supervise compliance, changes to governance, new auditing systems, and retention of independent monitors to supervise compliance. The DOJ's guidelines note prosecutors should try to assess whether the compliance program is just a "paper program" and should consider "whether the corporation has provided for a staff sufficient to audit, document, analyze, and utilize the results of the corporation's compliance efforts." 53 The DOJ has also made new efforts to conduct detailed review of such compliance provisions. These agreements typically last from two to three years.
I have examined the terms of these U.S. deferred and non-prosecution agreements with corporations in some details. About one quarter require the retention of monitors to supervise 51 U.S.A.M, § 1-12.000. 52 Id. § § 9-28.000-9-28.100, 9-28.300. 53 U.S.A.M. 9-28.800.
compliance, but most do not. The fines are often not all that they could be. I collected a set of federal deferred and non-prosecution agreements beginning in 2001. 54 I was surprised to learn that in almost half of the deferred and non-prosecution agreements with companies entered from 2001-2012, no criminal fine was imposed. 55 I also found that for public companies prosecuted U.S. prosecutors have also targeted financial institutions far more than ever before. In recent cases, they have not used deferred prosecution agreements but rather secured guilty pleas from banks. 57 The principles do say that "prosecutors should generally seek a plea to an appropriate offense," and also that "generally" this should be a plea to the "most serious, readily provable offense charged." 58 While the guidelines regarding organizational prosecutions in the U.S. do not state with any specificity when a conviction is appropriate versus a deferred prosecution agreement, prosecutors do appear more willing to seek convictions, including in high profile cases, than in the past decade, when many of the most significant corporate prosecutions were resolved out of court.
Canada
In Canada, corporations may plead guilty, under a plea bargaining system in which the judge may accept or reject the plea and the judge ultimately imposes the sentence. The plea agreements are not made public, but the accompanying statements of facts are public. 59 In addition to any penalty, a fifteen percent surcharge is added towards provincial victim restitution funds. 60 The approach does not permit the type of informal corporate settlements that are now common in the U.S., but there has been some discussion of the possibility of introducing deferred prosecution agreements in Canada.
United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom, corporations have long been criminally liable. Corporations have often settled criminal cases through guilty pleas. In such cases, the corporation admits guilt and receives a conviction. In addition, corporations may enter a Civil Recovery Order, in which a payment is made but there is no civil judgment. 61 The United Kingdom adopted deferred prosecution agreements with corporations by statute in the Crime and Courts Act of 2013. 62 One event prompting the legislation was the concern raised by the judge in the Innospec case, involving foreign bribery charges resolved in a 2010 settlement between the Serious Fraud Office, as well as prosecutors in the U.S. The judge called argued that in any criminal settlement process, "it is for the court to decide on the sentence and to explain that to the public." 63 The high court judge ruled prosecutors had unconstitutionally reached a sentencing arrangement with the company and that "no such arrangements should be made again." 64 The 2013 legislation permits such corporate settlements, but only with judicial oversight and approval. A detailed code of practice for prosecutors was published by the Crown Prosecution Service and Serious Fraud Office accompanying the legislation, and emphasizing the importance of the public interest in whether to offer a DPA. 65 The prosecutor must obtain a declaration from a judge that the DPA is "likely to be in the interests of justice" and that the terms are "fair, reasonable, and proportionate." 66 Once the agreement is negotiated, the terms are presented to the Crown Court for approval, and the judge can review the substance of the agreement and decide whether the agreement is "fair, reasonable, and proportionate." 67 In addition, any failure to comply with a DPA has consequences set out and a judge will adjudicate any possible breach. The first deferred prosecution agreement in the U.K., with Standard Bank, was approved by the judge, noting, in contrast to the situation in Innospec, that the court was permitted to make a "detailed analysis" of the circumstances of the offense and the financial penalty imposed and that "there is no question of the parties having reached a private compromise without appropriate independent judicial consideration of the public interest." Ministerie entered such a settlement with Russian telecom company Vimpelcom, which simultaneously settled with the U.S. Department of Justice, and with almost $400 million paid to Dutch and U.S. authorities. 71 In Norway, corporate prosecutions are also often settled out of court. In Norway, the mechanism is a penalty notice in which the prosecutor sets out the fine to be imposed. 72 Økokrim, the Norwegian authority that handles economic and environmental crimes, frequently uses penalty notices in corporate cases. 73 Økokrim explained to the OECD in 2011 that "economic crime trials are usually very lengthy and a much bigger burden on law enforcement resources .... furthermore, representatives of companies sometimes also prefer a swifter conclusion to a case to minimise the reputational risks to their corporation." 74 In Italy, corporations may settle criminal matters under the patteggiamento system, which resembles a plea bargain, and is overseen by judges. 75 If a company enters a patteggiamento, the entity may obtain a one-third reduction in the penalty, avoid making an admission of guilt, avoid debarment or other regulatory sanctions, and benefit from a possible "extinction" of the sentence after five years. The OECD has criticized the lack of information made public in cases in which companies settle charges using a patteggiamento. 76 Other countries use informal mechanisms to resolve corporate charges. Switzerland uses a summary punishment order, typically used for misdemeanor offenses, and a mechanism called "Reparation" after which charges are dropped if the defendant provides compensation. 77 In foreign bribery cases, including regarding Alstom and a subsidiary of Siemens, Reparation was used to settle cases. 78 Greece has settled foreign bribery cases against corporations using Parliamentary decree. 79 In Brazil, the Federal Public Ministry has entered leniency agreements with corporations, most prominently, with Odebrecht regarding the national Operation Car Wash scandal; questions remain whether other government agencies will honor the settlement.
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IV. Concerns with Corporate Prosecution Settlement Approaches
While the settlement-oriented approach towards corporate prosecutors has provided prosecutors with a great deal of flexibility, concerns have been raised with that approach in the U.S. and internationally. As discussed, countries such as the U.K. and France have adopted settlement regimes that involve more judicial supervision to alleviate concerns with such settlements, while preserving some of the flexibility that they provide. A series of functional considerations should be considered when deciding whether and how to pursue corporate prosecutions.
Transparency has been one concern raised regarding corporate settlements. Full trial or full criminal process can produce a public record concerning the crimes committed, full notification to victims, and a public trial or at least a public sentencing. Corporate defendants, of course, seek to avoid negative publicity in reaching a settlement with the authorities. One benefit corporate defendants may receive is the ability to not fully admit guilt (in the U.S., that is done in civil cases, but an admission of guilt is routine in criminal settlements). Some settlements do report the amounts of fines paid and some description of the facts, but often not based on a complete record or a detailed statement of facts. A separate concern has been with the amount of the fines themselves and how they are calculated. The DOJ has stated that punishment and deterrence can be accomplished by "substantial fines. corporate fines, but they have been criticized and they are often not used in cases that settle through deferred or non-prosecution agreements. 83 An additional concern has been with the structural or compliance terms of agreements.
Without judicial review, prosecutors may be less able than judges or regulators to independently assess whether corporations are complying fully with the non-financial terms of the agreements.
The DOJ has retained a compliance counsel to focus on reviewing and improving the compliance terms of corporate agreements. 84 Recently, the DOJ has issued guidance on the subject of corporate compliance, which is another improvement. In the past, many agreements had stated that a company should adopt best practices or a compliance program, but without specifying how it should do so or whether or how compliance efforts should be assessed.
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A separate concern has been that when prosecutors settle with corporations, while they may impose fines and compliance reforms, they may fail to prosecutor or deter executives other accountability, but it is too early to tell whether that additional guidance will be effective.
Judicial supervision may be limited for settlements. A separate concern has been that the public interest may be neglected without independent judicial review, or that prosecutorial discretion may be too great. The General Accountability Office criticized the DOJ in the U.S. for lack of criteria for deciding whether a company receives a deferred or non-prosecution agreements. 87 In 2013, federal judge Richard J. Leon rejected a deferred prosecution agreement with a company for foreign bribery, "looking at the DPA in its totality" and noting that not only were "no individuals . . . being prosecuted for their conduct at issue here" but also "a number of the employees who were directly involved in the transactions are being allowed to remain with the company." 88 However, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals rejected that ruling and held that the judge exceeded his discretion. 89 In another case, Judge Emmett Sullivan suggested that certain factors (could provide "useful guideposts" when evaluating whether a deferred prosecution agreement with a company is truly "designed to secure a defendant's reformation" or whether the terms are "so vague and minimal as to render them a sham." 90 In contrast, in countries in which judges may review and decide whether charges are appropriately brought against a defendant, and judges decide upon the sentence ultimately imposed, prosecutors cannot exercise nearly as much discretion when negotiating with corporations. 91 Countries have very different systems of criminal procedure, and those procedural rules may impact the desirability of settlement regimes and of corporate criminal liability itself. For example, in the U.S., corporations may decide to waive attorney-client privilege on behalf of employees, giving them a great deal of leverage in negotiations and also making the cooperation of the corporation extremely important in order to access evidence during investigations. 92 In countries in which evidentiary privileges are narrower, corporate investigations might be more feasible without that corporate cooperation. In contrast, in countries in which employees are not typically at-will and labor protections are stronger, it may be far more difficult for a corporation to encourage or pressure employees or officers to cooperate with law enforcement. Civil law alternatives may be important as well. If a country has adequate resources for civil corporate investigations and sufficient penalties are available, civil enforcement may effectively substitute for criminal enforcement against corporations.
Prosecutorial power is extremely broad in the U.S. Prosecutors have broad discretion to charge and to negotiate sentences through plea bargains and other types of agreements with defendants. That broad authority makes relatively more informal negotiated settlement regimes far more practicable in the U.S. than in countries in which judicial review would be presumed and out-of-court negotiations frowned upon or deemed unauthorized by law or unconstitutional.
Prosecutors in the U.S also have strong resources, the ability to bring complex cases to trial, and broad jurisdiction due to the role of trade with the U.S., the role that the U.S. dollar plays in international finance, and the U. 
V. International Cooperation
International organizations have played a role in corporate prosecutions and in promoting corporate accountability norms. For example, the United Nations and the World Bank have played a rule in foreign bribery cases. 94 The OECD has played an important role in Antitrust and foreign bribery work. The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention has established binding legal standards on member nations, and as the first such international law regime, it has had a great deal of influence. In addition, the OECD has promoted best practices, made recommendations, and evaluated member countries in reviews and reports. The OECD has provided advice to countries to combat tax crimes. Siemens included $800 million in fines paid to the DOJ and SEC and $800 million in fines paid to the Munich Public Prosecutor's Office. 95 The agreement also included two corporate monitors, one Independent U.S. Counsel, and a German corporate monitor, Dr. Theo Waigel, a former
German Minister of Finance. The employees prosecuted in the case were convicted by Munich prosecutors; individuals were indicted in the U.S. but none so far successfully extradited. 96 The
Fraud Section at DOJ has emphasized the role that international cooperation plays in foreign bribery cases generally, which are international crimes. The Antitrust Division similarly has emphasized joint investigations and mutual assistance agreements in its cartel enforcement, and it has worked with the International Competition Network and the OECD to promote cooperation.
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Conclusion
Corporate criminal enforcement has increased in frequency and in the size of monetary sanctions over the past decade. More countries have successfully prosecuted corporations, particularly in areas like antitrust and foreign bribery. Most of the prosecutions and settlements have been brought in countries that are major financial centers, with the bulk being brought in the United States, but also in the U.K., France, Germany, and increasingly in certain developing countries. The tools to resolve these corporate prosecutions are increasingly varied, using civil, criminal, and hybrid mechanisms. Parallel enforcement is far more common, with cooperation between enforcement agencies. As countries consider whether to adopt new tools to combat corporate crime, they should pay attention to both the successes of new approaches and to concerns raised regarding whether they serve the public interest. In the past, the common
